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Abstract
This paper analyzes how combining firms into either groups or
conglomerates affects their credit standing, as measured by their de-
fault probabilities, recovery rates and credit spreads. Each combina-
tion offers protection against default to its affiliates, and issues debt
to optimize the trade-off between tax gains and default costs. In a
group, the probability of joint default turns out to be lower than that
of both stand-alone firms and conglomerates. This is the bright side
of credit risk in groups. The dark side is that affiliation depletes the
credit worthiness of the subsidiary. Such results hold irrespective of
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parent is larger.
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1 Introduction
Empirical studies highlight changes in default risk when one company becomes affiliated
to both private equity funds and other companies. To mention a few examples, distress
risk increases after a private equity fund buys out a company, yet bankruptcies of buyout
companies are relatively rare considering that they display over 95% leverage (Jensen, 1989,
2007; Borell and Tykvova`, 2012)). Moving away from the private equity case, the default
frequency of a group affiliate responds to the credit standing of the other affiliated units
(Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle, 2006). Similarly, the spread paid by SPVs is affected by
the sponsors’ ratings (Gorton and Souleles, 2006). A fortiori, the default probability of a
stand-alone company changes when it merges with another one (Furfine and Rosen, 2011).
This paper studies how credit risk varies due to these affiliations, that are quite pervasive
across countries and had a relevant role during the financial crisis.
One reason for the observed change in credit standing is that affiliation brings protection
against default, in the form of either implicit or contractual guarantees. These have different
levels of legal enforcement and different realizations: they can take the form of cash transfers,
subsidized loans, support in a restructuring, collateral provision, transfer pricing at off-
market prices. The presence of such guarantees is well documented. In the US, for instance,
Bodie and Merton (1992) recognize that guarantees exist even when they are not reported in
balance sheets. Herring and Carmassi (2009) describe the nuances of intra-group guarantees,
which range from comfort letters to legally binding agreements. In emerging countries,
empirical evidence refers to Indian groups (Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2004)), Korean
chaeboels (Bae, Cheon, and Kang, (2008)) and Japanese keiretsu (Jensen, 1991).
The presence of group guarantees does not rule out selective default, i.e., the default of
one affiliate firm while other group members stay solvent. This occurs because each group
affiliate enjoys limited liability with respect to other group companies. This phenomenon
explains why rating agencies look at the type of group support for assessing the risk of debt
obligations (Emery and Cantor (2005)). On the contrary, after a merger the divisions of a
conglomerate share the same credit assessment.
These three facts, namely default risk modifications when entering a group, guarantees
and selective defaults, still need an explanation, up to our knowledge. Indeed, models that
endogenize default risk typically consider companies as stand-alone units and disregard
guarantees. This paper analyzes how combining firms affects their credit standing, as
measured by their default probabilities, recovery rates and credit spreads. To this end, we
propose a model for business combinations, enriched with the classical trade-off between tax
gains and default costs of debt. The distinguishing feature of each business combination
will be the type of protection against default among the component firms. In a parent-
subsidiary structure firms are separately incorporated and maintain limited liability1, even
if they rescue each other when there are sufficient cash-flows available. In a conglomerate
merger, on the contrary, the (originally stand-alone) companies become fully liable for the
common debt obligations. Finally, companies that do not belong to combinations, and
1This is the case in major jurisdictions, including the U.S., the U.K., Germany and France (Hadden,
1996; Blumberg, 1989).
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remain stand-alone, enjoy no guarantees. Since groups are an important example of parent-
subsidiary organization, in the sequel we use the two terms interchangeably.
The model delivers results concerning leverage and default risk of two BBB firms, once
they enter a business combination. A preview of our main results is as follows. Debt
financing - and the associated tax shield - is larger for a group than for the merger. It
is also larger for group-affiliated subsidiaries than for stand-alone firms. Despite this, the
probability of joint default for the two companies in a group is lower than that of two
comparable stand-alone units and their merger. This result, that holds for any level of
cash flow correlation between firms, is due to the optimal capital structure of the group in
the presence of guarantees. When the group members are identical, this entails a complete
shift of the debt burden onto the subsidiary, leaving the parent unlevered. By so doing,
the group optimally exploits the tax shield of debt net of default costs. What preserves the
high credit standing of a group is not diversification - which is at work in mergers - but
the guarantee together with limited liability. We also show that the shift of debt onto the
subsidiary is not always optimal with asymmetries between the parent and the subsidiary,
such as a much greater size of the parent.
The key insight of our analysis is there is a bright side in the credit quality of groups:
the parent’s and subsidiary’s joint default probability is smaller than both the stand-alone
companies’ and the merger’s. However, there is also a dark side: affiliation to a group con-
siderably depletes the credit worthiness of a subsidiary, and this is mirrored in its marginal
default probability, recovery rate and spread over the riskless return.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the set up. Section 3 analyzes the
stand-alone, parent-subsidiary and conglomerate cases through the BBB-numerical exam-
ple. It compares their credit standing as measured by default probabilities, recovery rates
and credit spreads. It does so in correspondence to the optimal leverage and for symmetric
firms, i.e. units which have the same bankruptcy costs, size and volatility. Section 4 exam-
ines whether the results are robust when correlation changes. Section 5 extends the same
analysis to groups made of asymmetric firms. The last Section concludes.
2 The model
We consider a no-arbitrage environment with two dates t = {0, T} and two firms or ac-
tivities. Each activity generates a random cash-flow Xi at time T , which has be to be
interpreted as the profit or loss from its operational activities. For the sake of simplicity,
Xi will be a Gaussian random variable. In each organizational form (stand-alone, parent-
subsidiary, merger), rules for debt repayment - in particular whether another member of
the groups helps in case of distress - are different2. For each organizational form we then
determine how much of the cash-flows Xi will be paid to bondholders and shareholders.
We also determine the value at time 0 of debt and equity as the expected, discounted value
of the corresponding payoff. Last, we assume that debt is optimized. Each organization is
2The model we build upon is developed in Luciano and Nicodano (2012), starting from the stand-alone
and merger case of Leland (2007). Luciano et al. (2012) also characterize the optimal guarantee.
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supposed to choose the face value of debt so as to maximize the overall firm value at time
0. Let the face value of debt be Fi and let D0i be its no-arbitrage value at t = 0. In the
stand-alone case, where firms are labeled 1, 2, we have:
max
Fi
ν0i(Fi) = E0i +D0i, i = 1, 2 (1)
where E0i is the time-0 value of each firm’s equity. In the parent-subsidiary case, where the
labels are p, s, we have
max
Fi
ν0g(Fp, Fs) = E0p +D0p + E0s +D0s, (2)
In the merger case we have
max
FM
ν0M (FM ) = E0M +D0M , (3)
where the index M stands for merger.
Since this is a structural model, the optimal level of debt determines the probability of
default, the recovery rate and the credit spread.
Default probability
The concept of default probability has to be tailored to each organizational form. Con-
sider stand-alone firms first. Each stand-alone firm either defaults or not. The marginal
default probability pii is the probability that cash-flows net of taxes, X
n
i , be smaller than
the face value of debt Fi at T :
pii = P [X
n
i < Fi] i = 1, 2
Since each stand-alone is either in default or not, four mutually-exclusive, joint occurrences
are possible. These are joint default, which occurs with probability pi12; joint survival;
selective default of either 1or 2. Joint default occurs when both cash flows are below the
face values of debt:
pi12 = P [X
n
1 < F1, X
n
2 < F2]
Selective default occurs when one firm survives while the other is in default. Its proba-
bility - which we denote as pi−i - is the difference between the marginal and joint default
probabilities. Consider firm 1:
pi−1 = P [X
n
1 < F1, X
n
2 > F2] = pi1 − pi12
Joint survival probability p¯i12 is computed considering that joint survivorship excludes both
joint default and selective default of both firms:
p¯i12 = P [X
n
1 > F1, X
n
2 > F2]
= 1− pi−1 − pi−2 − pi12
= 1− pi1 − pi2 + pi12
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Consider now a group. In the case of a parent, the event triggering default is equal to
the one of a stand-alone company:
pip = P
[
Xnp < Fp
]
The default of a subsidiary instead occurs only if the parent cannot provide funds for
avoiding it. The marginal default probability is equal to:
pis = P
[
Xns < Fs, X
n
p < h(X
n
s )
]
where h(Xns ) is the level of the parent cash flow below which support is not provided,
else the parent would be drawn into default by its subsidiary. This no-rescue level will be
determined below.
Selective default of the parent occurs as in the stand-alone case, while selective default
of the guaranteed firm occurs if the parent is solvent but has insufficient funds for support:
pi−p = P
[
Xnp < Fp, X
n
s > Fs
]
= pip − pips
pi−s = P
[
Fp < X
n
p < h(X
n
s ), X
n
s < Fs
]
Joint default still occurs when each cash flow is lower than the respective face value of debt:
pips = P
[
Xnp < Fp, X
n
s < Fs
]
Joint survival occurs when each firm reimburses its debt holders, either with or without
support:
p¯ips = P
[
Xnp > h(X
n
s ), X
n
s < Fs
]
+ P
[
Xnp > Fp, X
n
s > Fs
]
We label the first event as ”joint survival with rescue”, the second as ”joint survival without
rescue” and the corresponding probabilities as p¯irps, p¯i
r¯
ps, so that by definition:
p¯ips = p¯i
r
ps + p¯i
r¯
ps.
Figure 1 presents the corresponding events in terms of the two firms’ cash flows. Event A
is joint survival with rescue, event D joint survival without rescue.
Insert here figure 1
So the relevant probabilities take complex forms for parent-subsidiary groups, when
guarantees mitigate the default triggering condition.
Finally, in the conglomerate merger case we either have joint defaut, occurring with
probability:
piM = P [X
n
M < FM ]
or no default.
Recovery rate
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For all of the previous organizations, the expected loss is the difference between the full
repayment, Fi, and the recovery, D0i(1 + rT ), where rT is the riskless rate over the period
(0, T ). The percentage expected loss is then equal to:
Fi −D0i(1 + rT )
Fi
for i = 1, 2, p, s,M . By taking the ratio of each company’s expected loss to the corresponding
default probability, we get the loss given default, and therefore the recovery rate
Ri = 1− Fi −D0i(1 + rT )
Fi × pii
(4)
Credit spread
Last but not least, the spread y is the difference between the rate of return on zero-
coupon debt, which is the ratio between the face and present value of debt, and the riskless
rate:
yi = (Fi/D0i)
1/T − 1− rT (5)
The spread is an overall measure of credit quality, since it incorporates information on both
recovery and default probability - via the ratio of the face to the fair value of debt, Fi/D0i.
As in all structural models, the previous quantities (loss, recovery, spread) are endoge-
nous. By comparing such quantities across different organizations we will be able to discuss
their comparative credit standing. In order to facilitate the comparison - but without loss of
generality - we assume that, when two firms form a group, firm 1 becomes the parent, while
firm 2 is the subsidiary.3 This means that X1 = Xp, X2 = Xs, where equality is in distribu-
tion. The merger cash flow is simply the sum of the merged firms’ profits, since - consistent
with the other cases - we assume the absence of operational synergies: XM = X1 +X2.
2.1 Stand-alone companies
This Section describes how net cash flow of a stand-alone Xni is determined, provides a
restatement of the default-triggering condition Xni < Fi and establishes how debt of a
stand-alone is valued.
Let the two activities 1 and 2 be separately incorporated and independently managed.
Each one can issue a zero-coupon bond with face value Fi at time 0. They have an incentive
to do so as interest on debt is a deductible expense. However, debt increases the probability
of default, which is assumed to cost a fraction αi of cash-flows Xi, when they are positive.
So, debt generates the standard trade-off between tax gains and default costs. In our setting,
both are random when the leverage decision is taken and credit standing is evaluated, since
both depend on the random realization of cash-flows at the terminal date.
3Luciano and Nicodano (2012) endogenously characterize which firm should be the supporting one. They
also show that mutual support - the parent supports the subsidiary and viceversa - is suboptimal. This is
why it is never considered in this paper.
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Debt is due at T and debt holders have absolute priority with respect to shareholders.
Debt is paid after taxes, though. Since the promised interest payment or tax shield is XZi
XZi = Fi −D0i (6)
taxable income is the cash-flow Xi net of interest payment:
Xi −XZi (7)
There is a flat tax rate τi on cash-flows net of the tax shield. It follows
4 that cash-flows,
net of tax payments, are
Xni =

0 Xi < 0
Xi 0 < Xi < X
Z
i
Xi(1− τi) + τXZi Xi > XZi
(8)
We know that default occurs when net cash-flow at T is smaller than the face value of the
debt:
Xni < Fi (9)
Having defined the default threshold Xdi as
Xdi = Fi +
τi
1− τiD0i =
Fi − τiXZi
1− τi (10)
the default triggering condition (9) can be written in terms of the pre tax cash-flows as
Xi < X
d
i . The payoff Di to lenders at time T will equal Fi when Xi > X
d
i and the firm is
solvent. In the event of default, bondholders will receive a fraction (1−αi) of the cash-flow
Xi when this is positive. This happens after the firm has paid taxes, if cash-flows are above
the tax shield. The payoff to lenders is therefore
(1− αi)Xi 0 < Xi < XZi
(1− αi)Xi − τi(Xi −XZi ) XZi < Xi < Xdi
Fi Xi > X
d
i
The value of debt at time 0 can be written as
D0i(Fi) =
(1 + rT )
−1E
 (1− αi)Xi 1{0<Xi<XZi }+[(1− αi)Xi − τi(Xi −XZi )]1{XZi <Xi<Xdi }+
+Fi 1{Xi>Xdi }
 (11)
where 1{•} is the indicator function.
The payoff to shareholders at time T is cash-flow less taxes and the repayment of
principal, when the difference is positive: max(0, Xni − Fi).
By no arbitrage the value of equity is simply5
E0i(Fi) = (1 + rT )
−1E[ max(0, Xni − Fi)] (12)
4Following Leland (2007), we assume that no tax refunds are paid to the firm when Xi < X
Z
i .
5Note that (11) is an implicit equation, since XZi and X
d
i are themselves a function of D0i through (6)
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2.2 Parent-subsidiary
We now examine the parent-subsidiary case. This Section uses the net cash flow of single
firms, Xnp , X
n
s , in order to determine the rescue threshold h(Xs) and establishes how debt
of the subsidiary - who benefits from rescue - and equity of the parent - who provides it -
are affected.6
The parent company enjoys limited liability. If the subsidiary defaults, i.e. Xs < X
d
s ,
the parent transfers funds in order to rescue it only if three circumstances occur. First,
if debt to its own bondholders has been paid, Xp > X
d
p . Second, if the cash-flows of the
subsidiary are non-negative, Xs > 0. The parent would otherwise bear an operational loss
that it could have avoided. Third, if rescue does not endanger her survival. Put together,
these restrictions mean that transfer occurs if and only if the subsidiary is in default and
the parent’s cash-flows exceed a threshold h(Xs) :{
Xs < X
d
s ,
Xp > h(Xs)
(13)
The function h(Xs) is represented as a kinked line
7 in Figure 1. In the figure the occurrence
of these conditions is event A, i.e. joint survival with rescue. When rescue occurs, the parent
transfers exactly what the subsidiary is short of in order to repay debt, namely Fs − Xns .
The amount of the transfer then is
(Fs −Xns )1{A}.
The group shareholders are assumed to choose the face value of debt in the parent and
in the subsidiary so as to maximize levered group value. The group value ν0g is:
ν0g = ν0(Fp, Fs) = E0p +D0p + E0s +D0s (14)
For the sake of simplicity, we write down the model assuming that the tax rate and
default costs do not differ across the two units. Therefore, αi = α and τi = τ . This
assumption is removed later.
and (10). Numerical methods are required for its solution. Since D0i determines the thresholds and the
latter enter the equity value, the solution approach for finding firm value ν0i consists in finding a fixed point
for D0i and then determine X
Z
i , X
d
i and E0i.
6The default thresholds Xdi , i = p, s and the tax shield X
Z
i are related to debt principal and present
value by (6) and (10), as in the stand-alone case.
7Its expression is :
h(Xs) =

0 Xs < 0
k − Xs
1− τh 0 ≤ Xs < X
Z
s
K −Xs 1− τs
1− τh X
Z
s ≤ Xs < Xds
where, with equal tax rates for the two firms (τs = τh = τ),
k =
Ps
1− τ +X
d
h
K = Xdh +X
d
s
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The only difference in payoff-relevant events with respect to the stand-alone case is the
existence of the event A. The cash-flow accruing to shareholders of the parent company is
equal to the one of the stand-alone company, less the transfer. As a consequence, it depends
on both principals Fp and Fs:
max(0, Xnp − Fp)− (Fs −Xns )1{A} (15)
The equity value is
E0p(Fp,Fs) = (1 + rT )
−1E
[
max(0, Xnp − Fp)− (Fs −Xns )1{A}
]
(16)
The payoff to subsidiary lenders is the same as in the stand-alone case, in the states
where the subsidiary defaults since no transfer takes place.8 These states are formally
characterized as
B =

Xs < X
Z
s
Xp > X
d
p
Xnp − Fp < Fs −Xns
C =

XZs < Xs < X
d
s
Xp > X
d
p
Xnp − Fp < Fs −Xns
and are drawn in Figure 1. The main difference between events B or C is in whether
the subsidiary does not pay taxes (Xs < X
Z
s ) or pays them (X
Z
s < Xs < X
d
s ). The payoff
to lenders must instead be augmented by the transfer if event A occurs. There, it would
have been Xns . Including the transfer, it becomes X
n
s + (Fs −Xns ) = Fs.
Since the subsidiary debt is the present expected value of these final payoffs, it becomes:
D0s(Fs, Fp) =
(1 + rT )
−1 E
 Xs(1− α)1{B}++ [Xs(1− α)− τ(Xs −XZs )]1{C}+
+Fs
[
1{A} + 1{Xs>Xds}
]
 (17)
The payoffs to lenders of the parent do not change with respect to the stand-alone case,
as the transfer to the subsidiary occurs only after the service of the parent debt. Similarly,
equity holders of the subsidiary are unaffected, as the transfer occurs for the sake of servicing
debt. As a consequence equations (11) and (16) still hold for i = p and i = s respectively.
8We are assuming that there is no consolidation of assets in the event of default of the parent - which
seems consistent with what happens in most real-world cases (Samson, 2001).
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2.3 Conglomerates
The conglomerate merger case - introduced in Leland (2007) - obtains when the two activi-
ties Xi, i = 1, 2, are incorporated as divisions into one company. The merger cash-flow Xm
is the sum of the cash-flows of the original activities:
Xm = X1 +X2 (18)
The merger issues a unique debt. Its face value Fm maximizes the merger value ν0m
ν0m = ν0(Fm) = E0m(Fm) +D0m(Fm) (19)
where E0m(Fm) and D0m(Fm) are computed as in the stand-alone case, since the two cash
flows remunerate together debt and equity, exactly as the cash-flow of a stand-alone firm.9
Equations (11) and (16) still hold for i = M . From the point of view of computing debt
and equity, tax shields, default thresholds, survival and default probabilities, there is no
difference between the stand-alone and merger case. Only the definition of the underlying
cash flow is.
3 Credit risk: a base case
We numerically study the credit risk implications of the organizational structures outlined
above. The values of the parameters in a base case come from Leland (2007), who calibrates
them to firms that issue BBB-rated unsecured debt when stand-alone. Companies are
symmetric, in the sense that they have identically distributed cash-flows, the same tax and
default cost rate. The parameters in the base case are the following: the debt maturity
T is equal to five years, consistent with investment grade evidence. The annual riskless
interest rate is 5%, and the expected cash-flow for each activity, E(Xi), is chosen so that its
present value is 100. The standard deviation of these cash flows is 49.2. If annual cash-flows
are independent in time, this is consistent with an annual standard deviation of 22. This
implies an annualized volatility, σ, in percent of the present value of cash flow, of 22%. The
correlation coefficient between the cash flows is equal to 0.2. Finally, the tax rate and the
default cost parameter are respectively set to 20% and to 23%, so as to generate optimal
leverage and recovery rates consistent with the ones observed in a BBB stand-alone firm.
We obtain the optimal capital structure and credit risk indicators of table 1. The first
column reports values for a stand-alone. The second and the third refer to a parent and
a subsidiary respectively, while the fourth one depicts the overall parent-subsidiary group.
The last column refers to a conglomerate.
Insert here Table 1
We start by comparing the credit features of a stand-alone company versus a parent-
subsidiary group first (column one versus two-to-four). The stand-alone company versus
conglomerate (column one versus five) will follow. In the end we will be able to compare
the group and the conglomerate (columns four and five).
9XZm and X
d
m are defined as in (6) and (10).
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3.1 Groups versus stand-alone firms
Leverage
In order to understand the credit risk of different organizations, we must first look at
their leverage. Table 1 highlights two important features: the group is highly levered with
respect to two stand-alone firms; and all the group debt is in the subsidiary, instead of
being shared with the parent. This extreme capital structure obtains in the absence of
moral hazard. Indeed, the best solution to the tax- bankruptcy trade off is to raise capital
via the subsidiary, given the possibility of supporting it when insolvent. Support often
saves the subsidiary from bankruptcy, so as to avoid the loss of value inherent in default.
At the same time, the subsidiary does default when its rescue increases bankruptcy costs
so much that it would drag the parent into default. The resulting face value of debt in the
subsidiary is higher than in the two stand-alone firms (219 versus 114.4). This characteristic
of the optimal solution is consistent with the empirical evidence in Dewaelheyns and Van
Hulle (2006), who notice that the ”decreased potential costs of financial distress allow group
members to ex ante take on more debt, thus realizing more tax gains”10. The Table indeed
shows that the group pays lower taxes than two stand-alone firms (25.37 versus 17.62 times
2).
Default probabilities
Leverage impacts on the marginal default probabilities. These change from pi1 = pi2 =
11.2% for stand-alone companies to pis = 46.54% for the subsidiary. The latter is much
more likely to default than a stand-alone, in spite of receiving support, because of its
extreme leverage. This is consistent with the increase in the number of default occurences
observed after companies’ buyouts (Borell and Tykvova`, 2012). As for the unlevered parent,
its marginal default probability is just the probability that its cash flows turn negative,
pip = 0.34%.
Rescue of the subsidiary takes place more or less in one half of the cases, since the
corresponding probability is p¯irs = 52.35%. However, in the absence of rescue but keeping
the same leverage, the default probability would be even larger - actually close to one (pis =
99.3%). This is a possible explanation for the relatively low number of defaults of buyout
targets in highly leveraged transactions (Jensen, 1989, Jensen, 2007, Andrade and Kaplan,
1998). It also justifies concerns on the contribution to systemic risk, i.e. the destabilizing
effects of parent-subsidiary structures, since the default of a subsidiary, which occurs in
46.54% of the cases, endangers its lenders. Another figure that reveals such dark side of
group credit risk and related concerns is that joint survival occurs in more than one half of
the cases (p¯ips= 52.92%) while the two stand-alone firms survive with 79.73% probability.
Concerns should be mitigated by the observation that the joint default probability, pips
= 0.34%, is much lower than it would be without within-group support. For the comparable
10Such leverage produces a considerable increase in the group value ν∗0g (165.91) with respect to that of
a stand alone (162.46).Thus parent-subsidiary links, that preserve limited liability while allowing for state-
contingent support, create value for financiers. Luciano and Nicodano (2012) show this holds in general.
However, the value of the parent falls with respect to the stand alone situation (from 81.23 to 49.2), as it
discounts the povision of support to its subsidiary
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stand-alone firms joint default occurs 2% of the times (pi12 =2.08%). So, the risk that the
whole group goes bankrupt diminishes in spite of its high leverage, thanks to group support.
This may explain the low occurrence of group defaults in highly leveraged transactions (see
Altman et al., 2008). This is also good news for the contribution of parent-subsidiary
structures to systemic risk, and represents the bright side of group credit quality.
Recovery rate
The recovery rate falls from 48.1% for the stand-alone company to 31.2% for the sub-
sidiary. Indeed, the parent is more likely to be unable to support its subsidiary when the
latter losses are larger - leaving these low recovery cases to lenders. The decline in recovery
when the default probability increases - or, equivalently, the increase in loss given default
- is an important feature to capture, since empirical evidence supports it (see for instance
Altman et al., 2008).
Spread
As a consequence of high default probability and low recovery, the credit spread of the
subsidiary dramatically increases with respect to the stand-alone company. Over five years,
it becomes 8.4% versus 1.26%.
3.2 Conglomerate versus stand-alone
We now compare the conglomerate merger and its divisions to the stand-alone firms.
Leverage
In order to understand credit risk we look first at the optimal leverage which determines
it. The conglomerate raises more debt than the two stand-alone firms. The overall debt of
the conglomerate (117.4) is greater than the sum of two stand-alone debts (114.4). It derives
from the fact that divisions of a conglomerate diversify away some risk when the correlation
between their cash flows is lower than one (Lewellen, 1971). The merger can increase its
leverage because the tax advantages induced by the level of debt are not completely offset
by the increase in expected default costs, thanks to risk diversification.11
Default probability
Risk sharing is at work in a merger, because debt is issued against a diversified portfolio
of assets. This does not prevent the conglomerate to be more likely to default than two
stand-alone companies: in spite of being backed by a diversified portfolio, debt increases so
much with respect to the stand-alone case that the merger default probability is higher than
the one of a stand-alone firm. It reaches 6.5% instead of 2%, the joint default probability
of two stand-alone units. This happens since there is no limited liability. If one activity
performs poorly and the other is profitable, the former can drag the latter into default.
This is the well-known Sarig effect (Sarig, 1985).
Recovery rate
11The merger value is greater than twice the value of two stand-alone firms, thanks to this optimal leverage.
Leland (2007) shows that this is not always the case, becasue of the loss in limited liability.
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For the same risk sharing and mutualization - or lack of limited liability - reason, merger
is accompanied by higher recovery than a stand-alone. We have 56.5% instead of 48.1%,
since two cash flows back up the common debt and losses of one division can be mitigated
by profits of the other. So, when going from a stand-alone company to a merger, the effect
on default probability and recovery go into opposite directions.
Spread
A priori, the opposite effects just described could lead to either an increse or a decrease
in spread. It turns out that, for BBB firms with equal size, risk, tax and default rates, the
increase in recovery outweighs that in default probability. The spread is reduced with respect
to a stand-alone. It reaches 0.6% instead of 1.26% for each of its divisions. This simply
says that, for BBB firms, the overall credit quality improves because of mutualization, in
spite of higher leverage.
3.3 Group versus conglomerate
We now turn to the comparison between a parent-subsidiary group and a conglomerate.
Leverage
Our model shows that group debt is greater than for conglomerates (219 versus 117.4
in terms of face value). We explain this with the possibility of setting two different levels
of debt in the group affiliates, using the support option if and only if the parent survives.
In a merger, on the contrary, the divisions have to support each other even when this leads
to higher bankruptcy costs. The parent-subsidiary structure has higher optimal leverage
because it exploits the benefits of risk sharing without incurring into its costs.12
Default probability
Higher leverage usually leads to higher default probability. Looking again at Table 1,
we discover instead that the probability of joint default is 0.34% for the parent-subsidiary
group and 6.5% for the merger. This result obtains even if the optimal leverage ratio
is greater for groups than for conglomerates, 70% for the former and 54.8% for the latter,
i.e. total debt is 219 instead of 117.4. We explain it as follows. The specificities of the
group - namely limited liability and separate incorporation - allow it to choose not only
the amount of debt, but also its location (at the subsidiary versus the parent level) so as
to perfectly eploit the benefits of risk sharing while sheltering the parent’s cash flows from
being unusefully wasted in bankrutcy costs.
To sum up, parent-subsidiary structures considerably deplete the credit worthiness of
subsidiaries - measured in terms of marginal default probability, recovery rate and spread.
This is the dark side of group credit risk. There is a bright side too: the parent’s and
subsidiary’s joint default probability is smaller than both the stand-alone companies’ and
12As a consequence,the value of a group, ν∗0g = 165.91, exceeds that of a conglomerate, ν
∗
0m = 163.15., in
spite of its higher spread, debt and default probability.
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the merger’s. The contribution to systemic risk of parent-subsidiary structures will depend
on the relative importance in the economy of these dark and bright sides. An important
question is whether an increase in cash flow correlation brings group joint default probability,
thus shrinking the bright side of groups. In the next sections we show that previous results
on joint default risk extend not only to very large values of the cash-flow correlation, but
also to the case of asymmetric firms, because they are a straighforward implication of the
option to provide support, that in turn is a consequence of corporate limited liability.
4 Default risk as correlation changes
Cash-flow correlation tends to be high when the combined firms belong to the same industry.
Correlation may also increase during a crisis. This Section analyzes changes in the credit
standing of BBB symmetric firms as their cash flow correlation varies.
Leverage
Leland (2007) shows that a purely financial merger leaves unaffected leverage and default
risk of the two component firms if their cash-flow correlation is equal to 1. This is because
the distinctive characteristic of conglomerates is diversification. We might expect a similar
result to hold also for parent-subsidiaries, if we focus on diversification only. We might
forecast that the optimal face value of debt in groups converges to the stand-alone level, as
correlation among cash-flow increases, since the transfer from the parent to the subsidiary
becomes less likely. This intuition is incorrect, because it does not take into consideration
the possibility of sheltering the group from bankrupcty by reducing the leverage of the
firm that provides support. Taking this into consideration too, we infer that the parent-
subsidiary is still able to lever more than two stand-alone firms, even when correlation
is equal to one. Indeed, with perfect correlation, both cash flows can be used to service
debt, when they are positive; on the other hand, only the subsidiary incurs into costly
default when both are negative, since the parent preserves limited liability. This reasoning
works provided that the parent stays unlevered, otherwise also the parent defaults. Our
numerical results confirm this intuition: debt in the parent continues to be zero, leverage
in the subsidiary is still high and the parent-subsidiary is subject only to a minor decrease
in total leverage13. Figure 2, top , reports the optimal leverage ratio for the three types of
organizations.
Insert here Figure 2
As correlation increases and the effect of diversification vanishes, the optimal leverage
of a conglomerate indeed converges to that of a stand-alone company. On the contrary, the
one of groups falls from over 80% to less than 70%, a figure which remains 30% higher than
the leverage of conglomerates and stand-alone firms.
13As correlation increases, so does the face value of debt. But the value of equity increases by more given
its option-like payoff. This brings about a reduction in leverage, which remains larger than the one in the
stand-alone.
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Default probabilities
In the top panel of Figure 3 we plot the merger’s , two-stand-alone firms’ and group’s
joint probabilities of default.
Insert here Figure 3
The group default probability is always low, below 1%, and almost insensitive to cash-
flow correlation. It is always smaller than the merger’s, thanks to limited liability. It is also
smaller than the two stand-alone companies’, unless correlation is very low (in Figure 3, -0.5
or -0.8). The good survival properties of groups are thus robust to industry composition and
economic downturns, in sharp contrast to those of the merger. Its default probability is as
high as 10% for a 0.8 cash-flow correlation, but is already higher than 5% with uncorrelated
cash-flows.
As the bottom part of the figure shows, these effects occur at the expense of the sub-
sidiary, unless cash flow correlation is very low. Its default probability is dramatically higher
with respect to a stand-alone, unless correlation approaches -1. In this last case diversifi-
cation makes the guarantee so effective that the default probabilities of a stand-alone and
a subsidiary are almost indistinguishable.
For all levels of correlation, the subsidiary default probability is smaller than it would
be in the absence of guarantees. This becomes evident when we compare the subsidiary (in
green) with a stand-alone with the same leverage (in blue), as in the bottom part of Figure
3. The default probability of a subsidiary ranges from 10% to 55%, compared with 95%
for the highly levered stand-alone. This shows that the paradox of relatively infrequent
defaults, which has been observed in highly leveraged transactions (Jensen, 1989, Jensen,
2007, Andrade and Kaplan, 1998), may obtain even with high cash-flow correlation.
Recovery rate
The mid plot of Figure 2 represents the recovery rate: the inequalities across organiza-
tional forms hold throughout the correlation range. The spread sensitivity to correlation is
higher in the merger case. Cross subsidization makes the merger recovery both higher and
more sensitive to correlation than under no support (stand-alone) and under conditional
rescue (group), since pure risk sharing is at work.
Spread
The bottom plot of Figure 2 represents the credit spread. Again, apart from the fact
that the inequalities across organizational forms hold throughout the correlation range, we
notice that - as correlation goes down - the merger spread benefits from cross-subsidization.
The group spread is much higher, because of high leverage and conditional rescue only, and
does not vanish as correlation tends to -1.
We can summarize the results from Figures 2 and 3 as follows: the leverage of the group
exceeds the one of both the conglomerate and the corresponding stand-alone. The marginal
default probability and the spread of the subsidiary are higher than the merger’s and stand-
alone’s. Its recovery rate is smaller than for mergers and stand-alone firms. However, joint
default probability stays much lower.
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5 Asymmetric companies
In this Section we consider the credit risk of firm combinations that are not identical. In
particular, we analyze the cases of lower default costs (Table 2), higher volatility (Table 3)
and smaller size (Table 4) for the subsidiary.14 And we restore the ρ = 0.2 assumption, so
as to be able to make comparisons with our base case.
Different default costs
Insert here Table 2
Higher default costs in the parent (α = 75%) do not change the optimal capital structure
in a group, as the whole debt burden is still borne by the subsidiary (with α = 23% as in
the base case) only. A zero leverage for the parent’s leverage was indeed optimal even with
lower default costs. Given the absence of debt, the parent will never incur into bankruptcy
costs, which do not therefore affect credit quality in the subsidiary either. Thus the overall
credit risk assessment of groups is insensitive to default costs in the parent. Comparison
across Table 2 and Table 1 reveals that the effect of higher α is to reduce optimal leverage,
both in the merger (44% instead of 55%) and in the stand-alone (30.9% instead of 52%)
cases. This cannot prevent the recovery rate from falling, but leads to a lower joint default
probability in both the merger (2.9% instead of 6.5%) and stand-alone companies (0.77%
instead of 2.08%), relative to the base case. The group, with an unchanged optimal leverage
of the base case (70.33%), still enjoys lower joint default probability (0.34%) but has higher
spread (8.4%). This indicates that the parent-subsidiary structure is able to shield firm
activities from asymmetric bankruptcy costs, preserving both the bright and dark sides of
its credit quality.
Different cash-flow volatility
Insert here Table 3
Consider the case in which the annualized volatility of the subsidiary cash flow (σ = 44%)
is twice as large as in the parent (σ = 22%). A riskier subsidiary turns out to have
slightly larger face value of debt (223 up from 219), because the tax shield now delivers
higher tax savings. Such an increase in debt and larger cash-flow volatility implies that
the subsidary’s credit quality worsens. Its default probability increases (48.7% instead
of 46.5%); the corresponding recovery rate falls (20.2% instead of 31.2%) and the spread
reflects this (10.9% up from 8.4%)15.This increase in the spread is moderate compared to
that in a stand-alone firm, that jumps to 6.2% from 1.26%, since the face value of debt
increases to 83 up from 57.2. Conglomerates only marginally increase debt (up to 118 from
14We also examined the opposite cases, in which the subsidiary is costlier, less volatile and larger than its
parent company. We neglect them in our tables since we find that the corresponding value of the group is
lower.
15Also in the group case, we find that as default probability grows for higher volatility the recovery rate
falls. This is a stylized fact in the literature on credit risk (Altman et al., 2008).
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117.4) and diversification opportunities help contain the increase in the cost of debt (from
0.6% to 2%).
Thus spreads in firm combinations, both groups and mergers, are less sensitive to changes
in cash flow volatility than in the stand-alone firms. This is also true for joint default
probabilities: the one of mergers falls slightly to 6.35% (down from 6.5% in the base case),
the one of groups is unchanged at 0.34%, the one of the stand-alone firms reaches 5.64 (up
from 2.08 in the base case). Thus, the credit quality of firm combinations appear to be less
sensitive to a highly volatile cash-flows in one of their units. However, the marginal default
probability for the subsidiary is still higher than the stand-alone firm’s (48.71% instead of
37.09%). Both the bright and the dark side of credit risk in business groups carry over to a
situation of asymmetric risk.
Different size
Insert here Table 4
Let us explore the case in which the parent is five times as large as its subsidiary,
in the sense that the mean of the final cash-flow is such a multiple (E(Xp) = 5E(Xs)).
All other parameters, including volatility, are equal to the base case in both units. Suchs
size asymmetry is irrelevant to the credit assessment of stand-alone companies, because all
optimal choices are simply scaled up or down, with ratios and probabilities unchanged.
The asymmetry makes it profitable for the group to raise debt from the parent, because
it allows to exploit the tax shield without compromising the parent’s provision of support
to the small subsidiary. The leverage ratio in the parent grows from zero to 51%, while
that of the subsidiary is unchanged relative to the base case (100%). The parent cash-flow
is large enough to be able to rescue its subsidiary despite its positive debt commitment:
the rescue probability is 66.56%, up from 52.35% in the base case. The credit quality of
the parent drops, as its default probability increases to 4.5% from 0.34% in the symmetric
case. The subsidiary has lower default probability than in the base case (33.04% instead
of 46.54%). However, the joint default probability of the group is now higher than the one
of two stand-alone companies (4.55% relative to 2.05%). Thus, differences in size smooth
both the dark and the bright sides of credit risk in business groups.
6 Summary and concluding remarks
Our analysis provides an assessment of credit risk when firms become interdependent. It
contributes to the literature by showing how state-contingent support in business groups,
together with a tax-bankruptcy trade-off, modifies default probabilities, recovery rates and
credit spreads in affiliated companies. We explain why the prediction of default frequency
improves when the credit standing of the other affiliated units is taken into account (De-
waelheyns and Van Hulle, 2006). More than that, it rationalizes selective defaults and the
discriminating assignments of ratings by most agencies when a parent-subsidiary link is in
place (Emery and Cantor, 2005). Finally, our groups resemble private equity arrangements,
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in that they display relatively infrequent defaults which have been observed in LBOs and
MBOs.
The key insights of our analysis are as follows. Groups appear to unevenly distribute
leverage and default risk among the affiliate firms, even when they are identical as stand-
alone firms. The default probability of subsidiaries increases, due to an optimal debt as high
as four times the one of alternative firm organizations, while the parent has low, even zero,
leverage. Interestingly, such risk shifting obtains without any moral hazard: raising debt
through a guaranteed company provides the same tax relief with lower expected bankruptcy
costs. As a consequence of this uneven distribution of debt, the default probability of
individual subsidiaries increases, but the joint probability that all firms simultaneously
default decreases, when compared to alternative organization. In this respect, groups appear
to have good own survival properties, much better than conglomerate mergers that exploit
diversification but cannot protect their divisions by using limited liability. This observation
is reinforced when cash-flow correlation is high, i.e. when affiliates belong to the same
industry or a systemic crisis is occurring. Under these circumstances the merger suffers
from scarce diversification opportunities. On the contrary, these persist in groups because
of the unlevered parent, that makes its cash flow available for the subsidiary when this is
unable to service its debt. Both the positive and negative credit risk properties of parent-
subsidiary structures carry over to the case of affiliates with heterogenous bankruptcy costs
and cash flow volatility. They smooth out with differences in size.
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Figure 1: This figure shows the cash flows combinations ensuring the rescue of an insolvent
subsidiary, as well as the areas of joint or selective defaults with infinitesimal ownership. It
represents the cash flow of the subsidiary on the horizontal axis and of the parent on the
vertical axis. Event A is the area which presents diagonal lines. Event B is the dotted area.
Event C is the area with horizontal lines. Event D is the white area between area A and
the horizontal line at level Xdp .
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Figure 2: This figure depicts optimal leverage, recovery rate and credit spreads for the
different organizational forms, as correlation between cash flows increases.
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and two stand alone firms (top) and the default probability of a stand alone versus a group
subsidiary (bottom). The probabilities are depicted as functions of the correlation between
cash flows.
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